Yes, history can repeat itself: Supermac also had his Iraq-Kuwait crisis

in 1961 struggled with a crisis in Kuwait, doubts over Europe, fears

over immigration, and a sluggish economy.

In fact, a day spent going through the files for 1961, which were

released after 30 years spent gathering dust, is an exercise in deja vu

and frustration, proof positive of how ludicrous the British obsession

with secrecy can be.

The Kuwait crisis of the summer of 1961 was short-lived, but would

have made a fine example for preventative diplomacy 30 years later had

anyone bothered to look. It began with hints that the then Iraqi leader

General Qassim was preparing to assert Iraq's claim on Kuwait, which

prompted urgent British military preparations to reinforce the Emir, and

a preview for 1990.

The Cabinet concluded that American and Saudi support was essential;

that the British ambassador in Baghdad should warn the Iraqi government

of the military consequences of its actions; and that potentially

negative reaction from the rest of the Arab world should be anticipated

and defused.

The Royal Marines were sent ashore and the Government worried about

Russian technicians helping the Iraqis. But the Iraqis never came, and

by September the crisis had faded away. Kuwait joined the Arab League,

casting doubts on Britain's future role in the area. The Cabinet

recognised that the new political situation meant Britain might have to

rely increasingly on political methods to secure its interests.

The Government concluded ominously that, although oil interests were

worth protecting, a military presence might be unnecessary: ''In the

longer term we should weigh the value of those interests against the

future cost of being prepared to maintain Kuwait's independence by

military means.''

A more persistent concern for the Macmillan Government was the issue

of joining the fledgling European Community, then dominated by France

and its president, Charles de Gaulle, a fierce opponent to UK

membership.

The Cabinet felt that public opinion was in favour, but worried that

sentimental attachment to the Commonwealth and British agriculture could

easily be aroused, and warned that ''in the Conservative Party this

could evoke strong emotional reaction.'' The Cabinet even heard fears

that membership could pose a threat to national sovereignty.

Macmillan saw the European debate as part of the wider context of the

worsening struggle between East and West. He told the Cabinet that this

''secular struggle'' could eventually undermine and weaken the

Commonwealth, whereas British membership of the EC would strengthen the

West against communism.

In his way stood de Gaulle. Macmillan sought to enlist the help of the

recently-elected President Kennedy to persuade de Gaulle, and even went

so far as to offer the French access to British nuclear technology in

exchange for favourable consideration. De Gaulle was unmoved, but this

did not deter the Cabinet from agreeing to enter into negotations with

the EC in July.

Immigration also preoccupied the Government. In May Viscount Kilmuir,

the Lord Chancellor, told the Cabinet of a ''startling increase in the

number of coloured immigrants'' which could bring the total for 1961 to

200,000. Unless action were taken, he warned, Britain could be faced

''in the space of a few years with a colour problem approaching that of

the US''.